TOP SECRET WM

25 January 1951

SUBJECT: REDRAFT OF PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 of NIE-25.

I. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

Soviet Objectives and the Current Situation

In pursuing their ultimate objective of a world made up of Soviet-type states under the control of the Kremlin, the Soviet leaders have attempted to exploit the power vacuum resulting from the Second World War. Although they have achieved marked results in Eastern Europe and China since 1944, they have been encountering increasing resistance from the the United States. The European Recovery Program has substantially aided in rehabilitating the Western European economy and reduced, if not eliminated, Soviet opportunities to exploit economic unrest there; the US aid-to-Greece program has eliminated the threat of the Communist guerrillas to the stability of Greece; US-sponsored action in the UN brought about the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Iran; US military aid to the French in Indochina has retarded the Communist-led Viet Minh forces; US-sponsored and US-supported intervention of the UN in Korea has introduced complications into Soviet plans for the Communist conquest of Korea; US intervention in the Straits of Formosa has temporarily, at least, prevented Chinese Communist forces from de-

-1.

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000600020064-2

stroying the remnants of Chinese Nationalist power; US economic aid has propped up the heretical Communist regime in Yugoslavia; under US sponsorship, a new European land army is in the process of formation and efforts are being made to integrate German units into that army; finally, the US has already begun a disguised rearmament of Japan and US officials have openly proposed and encouraged suggestions for full Japanese rearmament.

2. The Soviet leaders, in exploiting the power vacuum in the wake of World War II, evidently had (hoped) for an opportunity to develop sufficient economic and military strength to insure the security of the USSR, to consolidate their control over their own people and over the new Communist satellite states, to make secure the strategic approaches to the Soviet orbit, to undermine the non-Communist governments on periphery of the Soviet orbit, progressively to weaken and undermine the strategic position and influence of the principal non-Communist powers, and eventually to establish Communist control over Eurasia by subversion, pressure, or local military action. As a result of US countermeasures, however, the Soviet leaders must now view the United States as the principal obstacle in the way of achieving, not only their ultimate objective, but also those intermediate objectives by which they had evidently hoped to make easier the task of eliminating US power. Above all, US action in deApproved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000600020064-2

ploying military forces in Korea and approaching the very borders of the USSR, US plans to develop a European land army, and US efforts to rearm such traditional enemies as Germany and Japan, might well be regarded by the Soviet leaders, not merely as an attempt to retard or contain them, but as a direct threat to the USSR itself. Thus, the Soviet rulers must be giving consideration to the possibility of initiating general hostilities with the US injeffort to eliminate both a threat and an obstacle.